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Abstract
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) was rolled out across India in 2008. Following positive appraisals of NREGS based on quantitative data (e.g. Uppal 2009), the paper uses individual and group interview and household survey data from adults and children aged 15-16 to explore firstly whether these appraisals are confirmed by children’s accounts of its impact, and secondly whether the evidence from the three villages sub-sampled in the qualitative research suggest its success is sustainable (for example, instances of financial mismanagement, growing resentment among local landlords, etc.). One positive finding is that participation in NREGS is high and largely pro-poor. There are striking examples of individual benefits, intended and unintended, for example, female labourers who no longer accept a daily wage of Rs 40. There may also be significant environmental benefits, although these will not be evident for another three to four years. However, those who only work in the scheme because they are landless have not benefitted as much as expected. The main beneficiaries in the three villages have been individual farmers, often from higher castes, and to some extent administering officials. So while interview and survey data demonstrate beneficial effects, the systemic mismanagement described in the paper is having a corrosive effect on trust and social relationships. This unintended consequence threatens the sustainability of the scheme and its potential to reduce socio-economic inequalities and vulnerability across the life course.

Introduction
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), said to be the largest public works programme in the world, was rolled out nationally in 2008 after extensive piloting in the poorest districts. While NREGS is a high profile scheme, there are relatively few papers assessing its effects that combine qualitative and survey data and none that use data gathered from children. The paper argues that while participation in NREGS is high and largely pro-poor and there are striking examples of individual benefits, the systemic mismanagement described in the paper threatens the sustainability of the scheme and its long-term impact. In the following section we briefly summarise literature on the operation, monitoring and impact of the scheme, before focusing on its performance in Andhra Pradesh, drawing on Reddy et al. (2010).

NREGS was based on the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme promoted by Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen (1989). It is open to all rural households and acts as informal social insurance. Once a household and its members have registered for a job card NREGS guarantees up to 100 days unskilled manual labour for every adult available to work on that day at a rate of no less than Rs 100 per day (Rs 121 from January 2011). It pays the same rate for everyone, irrespective of age, caste, or gender (Johnson & Tannirkulam 2009). As participants work in groups, slower or weaker individuals are not disadvantaged by their inability to complete their share of the work. Nonetheless, the physically demanding nature of the work is less appealing to people who are older or have disabilities or health problems. For this reason Porter (2010) found that the highest coverage of NREGS within the Young Lives sample was in the second poorest expenditure quintile rather than the poorest. Although the scheme appeals to women since they have fewer opportunities to earn a good wage and work is provided within 5 km of the household, female household heads prefer daily wage labour as it can take up to one month to receive payment from NREGS (Sudarshan et al. 2010). 

While the scheme has been successful in reaching marginalised groups, in many states it has attracted substantial numbers of non-poor and land-owning participants due to the favourable wage rates. These participants can better withstand the variability in wages associated with piece-work (where the amount received varies according the amount of work done) and the delays in payment (Imai 2007; Scandizzo et al. 2009). Jha et al. (2009) found that in Andhra Pradesh households with more land were participating more, possibly due to the wage rate being more than twice as high as the market rate for unskilled labour. Uppal’s (2009) noted that participation in NREGS is related to the number of influential relatives in the community, which suggests that some groups are getting preferential access, and Shankar et al (2010) observed that in Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra the non-poor are more likely to have information about the scheme, acquired through social networks such as self-help groups, mobile phones, public meetings, and the television. They are therefore more likely to join and successfully argue for their rights within the scheme. 

The NREGS working ‘day’ is 7am to 12 or 1pm, which is less time than it would take to earn a similar amount as a daily labourer. Types of work include breaking/ moving stones, levelling the ground, checking and repairing dams and irrigation channels, desilting tanks, digging pits around saplings and providing piped water. If work is not made available within 15 days the household is entitled to unemployment benefit, although this is rarely offered (in 2009 less than 5% of Young Lives sample reported receiving it). NREGS departed from previous employment guarantee schemes by banning the use of 'labour displacing machinery' and local contractors who have historically exploited the rural poor. It aimed to provide good quality work with a minimum wage and good working conditions, including drinking water, healthcare and childcare if more than five children aged under five are on site (Ambasta et al. 2008). Nonetheless, PACS (2008) found that worksite facilities such as drinking water, shade, first aid, and a crèche were not provided in nearly half of the surveyed panchayats (in Andhra Pradesh only water was consistently provided, Reddy et al. 2010). According to Young Lives (2006) data childcare was available at less than ten percent of workplaces. This meant that women did not participate, or took siblings out of school to care for babies at home or onsite, or left babies with preschool children (Sudarshan et al. 2010). 

Almost all respondents said that wage payment was made on the basis of work measurement and had seen officials measuring the work that had been done. However, 50% of respondents felt their daily rate did not reflect these calculations (PACS 2008). The reason for the lack of correspondence is that NREGS are using a Schedule of Rates designed for a system of contractors, who don't pay minimum wages, and machines. This schedule has not been adapted to local geology/ climate, specific activities, the capacities of different types of worker, etc., or revised in line with minimum wages (Ambasta et al. 2008; Mehotra, 2008). Despite the revision of the Schedule in 2007 by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, workers find it almost impossible to earn the full Rs 100 and this creates great resentment:

While the Rajasthan model [piece-work] is often flagged as ‘good practice’ because it seeks to link earning to effort and productivity, the actual outcome of very low wage payments for very hard work is not acceptable
(Sudarshan et al. 2010:9)

Mehotra (2008:31) proposes either having daily wages, which reduces the need for technical input in assessing work done (this is the practice in Kerala), or involving workers in costing work to avoid the Schedule of Rates “[being] used to manufacture estimates and cheat labour”. Low wages can also be caused by misguided attempts to respond to local needs by employing more workers than are required for a piece of work to avoid complaints from those who are not selected. The money allocated for the work is then divided among all the participants who therefore receive less than the minimum wage.

The preceding section highlights the goal of improving livelihoods through decent work, however, NREGS’ objectives extend beyond “enhanc[ing] livelihood security in rural areas” to include “generating productive assets, protecting the environment, empowering rural women, reducing rural-urban migration and fostering social equity” (Porter 2010:18). The Indian government therefore expected the costs of NREGS to follow an inverted u-trend (contrary to other wage employment schemes) where the high initial costs of the scheme plateaued and then reduced as land productivity increased from 2% to 4% due to the quality of the productive assets constructed through the scheme. This would mean that marginal farmers could return to working on their own farms, leaving NREGS solely for landless labourers (Mehotra, 2008). 

Staffing and procedures
In 2006 NREGS had an administrative budget of 2%, which has grown to 6% in recognition of the enormity of its task. The limited budget at the outset caused delays in appointing block-level​[1]​ programme officers and field assistants: nearly a third of states had not appointed officers and half of the Gram Panchayats​[2]​ had not appointed assistants (CAG 2007). Having dedicated staff at Panchayat level was important as Panchayat staff currently administer over 200 different schemes for rural areas: "in a sample study done in Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka, the World Bank found that, on an average, a village sarpanch (elected head of the Panchayat) or official has to keep track of 470 accounts and deal with 17 line departments involving 50 officials!" (PACS 2008). A third of states had not set up Technical Support Groups (panels of engineers) to cost and evaluate works and there were only two junior engineers per 140 villages, who were also responsible for six other programmes (ibid). The lack of engineers led to delays in wage payments as there was no-one to 'sign-off' on work done. It meant that work was often poor quality and the number of days of work generated in the second year of NREGS showed little increase from the first year (Mehotra 2008; Ambasta et al. 2008). Lack of staff limited attempts to involve villagers (‘social mobilisation’) and tailor programmes of work to local needs - public works were selected based on what had been done before and could be easily measured.

NREGS develops five year district-level plans that are based on the annual plans of Gram Panchayats, which have been approved by specially convened Gram Sabha​[3]​. The reason for this is that it makes the process of selecting public works transparent – no accusation of favouritism towards particular landowners – and the assets generated will reflect local needs. However, PACS (2008) found that many district plans were late, partial, not based on Gram Panchayat plans, or not developed through a well-publicized Gram Sabha meeting (the latter was the case in over 50% of panchayats surveyed). Instead districts used existing plans and depended heavily on projects such as roads that are easy to plan and build and make greater use of materials, providing more opportunities for “financial leakage”. Although many projects in Andhra Pradesh focused on the NREGS priority of water conservation, they were not always successful as communities had little experience of this, there was no budget for their maintenance, they were difficult to build within the limit of 40% for material costs, and they needed to be combined with soil conservation measures, which were not always established (ibid).

Accountability Mechanisms 
When NREGS started there were widespread predictions that corruption and poor service delivery mechanisms would reduce its impact to such an extent that “one of India’s most well-known economists infamously suggested that the likelihood of money reaching the poor would be higher if we ‘simply drop the money by helicopter or gas balloon into rural areas’ than route it through employment programs'” (Aiyar & Samji 2009:5). NREGS aimed to combat this perception with decentralized planning and implementation (at least 50% of works were organised by the Gram Panchayat), ‘proactive disclosure’ (e.g. display of information on Gram Panchayat notice boards and online), ‘leak-proof’ wage payment system (weekly payment of wages through individual accounts in post offices) and bi-annual ‘social audits’. 

PACS (2008) found that in nearly 80% of the surveyed blocks, 100% inspection of work by local officials was not done, and even fewer blocks were inspected by district or state officials. Audits also reveal poor local record keeping; for example, incomplete job card and complaint registers in over 50% of Gram Panchayats. Reddy et al. (2010) report higher standards in Andhra Pradesh (for example, completed and signed muster rolls [records of workers’’ attendance] available for inspection in almost every site), but note that in a third of cases workers' job cards were incomplete which makes it hard for them to contest discrepancies in payment. These findings suggest that even though the Government of Andhra Pradesh developed a sophisticated Management Information Systems database, this may not have resolved the problems identified in the literature as any database is only as reliable as the data it contains. 

One of NREGS’s most distinctive features is the social audit, which is held biannually and involves 11 separate stages, culminating in a public meeting (‘social audit forum’). Aiyar and Samji (2009) report that as a result of the social audits over 500 field assistants and 10 technical assistants have been dismissed, Three Mandal​[4]​ Development Officers have been suspended, inquiries have been initiated against at least six other Mandal officials, and Rs 60 Lakh worth of embezzled funds has been returned (as the budget in 2009 was Rs 39,000 crores, or 3.9 million Lakh, this represents a relatively small percentage, which may indicate lack of corruption or lack of success in recovering funds). The audit also raises awareness of workers’ entitlements such as the 100 day guarantee and provision of shade and water at the worksite. In Andhra Pradesh social audits are regularly conducted and Young Lives data suggests nearly a quarter of villagers participate. However, some studies suggest that they are conducted in a way that doesn’t enable genuine participation and by concentrating on implementation issues cannot address more important concerns such as the exclusion of certain social groups or the quality of the work (PACS 2008; Gopal 2009). 

While NREGS has not followed the apocalyptic trajectory proposed by Moore and Jadav (2006:1293) involving “descent into some mixture of gross corruption, exploitation for narrow political patronage, and loss of reputation and support”, numerous examples of petty corruption and more fundamental problems have been identified. For example, PACS (2008) reports complaints of non-payment/ delayed payment of wages, payments below minimum wage, and payment to unregistered/ fictitious/ underage/ dead labourers. Gaiha (2005), Moore and Jadhav (2006) and Mehotra (2008) note a lack of enthusiasm from operational staff, especially in remote area where Scheduled Tribes live. This is due in part to the challenges of NREGS implementation and limited opportunities for financial leakage. Moore and Jadhav (2006:1293) note that “a programme like [NR]EGS is likely to remain in place and on track only if potential jobseekers are organised and mobilised to put continual pressure on the administration” as otherwise the disparate voices of the poor will be drowned out by more powerful and cohesive stakeholders such as landlords and officials. This proposition is confirmed by Shankar et al (2010) who observed that the corollary of the low ‘elite capture’ in Rajasthan (relative to Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra) was that corruption at the implementation level was higher because there was little effective monitoring. 

Perceived impact
Many authors, e.g. Imai (2007), suggest that the greatest benefits of NREGS are experienced by small and medium farmers whose land is targeted for development. For this reason others believe that NREGS’ focus should be genuinely public works that increase the economic security of the whole community. Examples of these are provided by Johnson and Tannirkulam (2009) and Scandizzo et al. (2009) who note greater resistance to the economic effects of shocks such as bad weather, which typically affect whole communities. Although one of the aims of NREGS was to generate work, Imai (2007) provocatively suggests that its impact may have been reduced by the strict ratio for expenditure (40% materials, 60% labour). This was designed to increase the benefits to participating workers and reduce opportunities for corruption; however, it may have limited the productivity of completed schemes as not enough was spent on materials. The final section of the review focuses on NREGS’s performance in Andhra Pradesh before seeing the extent to which these findings are supported by Young Lives data. 

Andhra Pradesh
In Andhra Pradesh NREGS was introduced in the 200 poorest districts in 2006 and extended to all 615 rural districts in 2008. Participants were from the most marginal social and economic groups: 45% were Scheduled Caste, 5% Scheduled Tribe​[5]​ and 51% female. By March 2010 4.1 million works had been taken up in Andhra Pradesh and 45% of them completed (Reddy et al. 2010). 100% of households had job cards, 71% requested work and more than 90% received work within 15 days. The average number of days worked per household was 74, and more than half of households claimed between 75 and 100 days. Reddy et al. (2010) note that payments are timely and higher than agricultural wages and estimate that they account for 9.6% of household income. ‘Distress’ migration has been reduced, however, male migration for higher wages continues. This is partly due to a perception of NREGS work as sporadic and of short duration which arises from a history of NREGS projects being delayed while awaiting approval or investigation of an irregularity, or postponed to accommodate peak agricultural periods after requests from landowners. 

Many studies, e.g. CBGA (2006, in Dreze, 2006), have placed Andhra Pradesh at the forefront in implementing NREGS due to the high level of population awareness, relative to other states such as Jharkhand, and technological innovations. Its popularity within Andhra Pradesh was evidenced by the popular distress when the death of the Chief Minister who started the scheme threatened its continuation. NREGS appears to be reaching the poor as only 3% of participants in Andhra Pradesh are above the poverty line (Reddy et al, 2010). However, Reddy et al. warn "these very characteristics of the participating households [i.e. that they are predominantly poor and marginalised] may also create the conditions for misuse and neglect of processes, and therefore call for effective institutional and governance structures” (ibid:66). They observe that despite the commitment of the political leadership the local panchayats are weak which reduces their ability to mobilise villagers in planning and monitoring the work (a core function identified by Moore and Jadhav, 2006). Reddy et al. (2010) also note some warning signs in relation to the future of the scheme: guidelines and recordkeeping requirements are perceived as burdensome, there is a lack of local technical expertise which affects the quality of work, and it is hard to track granting of unemployment allowance. While many workers enjoy the experience of working in groups, the fact that these groups are often caste or gender-based creates potentially discriminatory dynamics, for example, risky works being given to Scheduled Caste groups, or single women struggling to find a group (Sainath, 2007; Young Lives data, Poompuhar). Finally, as the majority of work in Andhra Pradesh is land development (45%), there is some resentment that the benefits accrue to landholders, not the landless. The empirical section of the paper explores the extent to which these warning signs are visible in Young Lives sites. 

2. Methodology
The fieldwork took place in March 2010 in three rural communities that have been part of Young Lives quantitative data collection since 2002 and were used in longitudinal qualitative research in 2007, 2008 and autumn 2010. The qualitative data reported in this paper comes mainly from children participating in the longitudinal qualitative research; for further information on their selection see Vennam and Komanduri, 2007. All names of communities and respondents have been replaced by pseudonyms. 

Katur 
Katur is a near-rural village in Anantapur district, 40 km from one of the state’s major railway junctions and accessible by an all-weather road. While the majority of the population is Scheduled or Backward Caste, there are five Forward Caste households who are the main landowners​[6]​. The main occupations in the village are agriculture, animal husbandry and wage labour. The area is drought-prone and dependent on migration and now NREGS during the dry season.

Poompuhar
Poompuhar is a near-rural village in Mahabubnagar district that is accessible by an all-weather road and public and private transport. The majority of the population is Backward Caste, although there is a small Scheduled Caste ‘colony’ (neighbourhood) at the entrance to the village. The main occupations are agriculture, predominantly cotton, animal husbandry and wage labour. Seasonal migration is common. 

Patna
Patna is a remote tribal village in Srikakulam district without an all-weather access road. While the majority of the population is Scheduled Tribes, the community is dominated by a small number of Forward and Backward Caste households. The main occupations are agriculture, horticulture (e.g. growing mangos and cashews), and collecting non-timber forest produce. Additional employment opportunities are provided by the Integrated Tribal Development Agency. The community experiences frequent cyclones and roads can be cut off by water flowing from the hills.
 
The qualitative sample comprised Young Lives and other children aged 15-16 and key informants such as the NREGS Field Assistant (administrator, one per panchayat), Meti (work group leader) and the Sarpanch. The study employed the same fieldworkers used in previous longitudinal qualitative research to build on existing relationships. They carried out individual interviews with key informants and group interviews with older boys and girls exploring the role of NREGS in local livelihoods. 

Table 1: Respondents who provided qualitative data used in this paper 

	Patna	Katur	Poompuhar
Group interviews with children	1 (girls), total n 5	2 (girls & boys), total n 10	2 (girls & boys), total n 10
Individual interviews with children	4 girls, 1 boy 	4 girls, 4 boys 	3 girls 




3.1. Overview: Quantitative 
Staffing and procedures
Within the Young Lives rural sample as a whole (n=1,466), 76% of households had a job card, ranging from 54% of households in Patna to 95% in Katur. Households from Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe households were most likely to have cards (85.5% and 83% respectively) and households classified as ‘Other’ (Forward caste groups and Muslims) were least likely to have them (54%). 67% of the households had someone working for the scheme in the last 12 months, suggesting that the cards are not merely being taken as insurance (this compares favourably with data from 2006 showing only 19% of rural households working in the last 12 months). In the three villages even wealthy households had worked for up to one week while NREGS was working on their land. When this question was analysed by caste, Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Caste households were most likely to have had a member working in the past 12 months (both 77%) and Other were least likely (42%). 

23% of respondents said that there were childcare facilities in their last worksite, although this was only relevant to 28.5% of them as the other households did not have children under five. 3% of households reported that single female household members had been refused employment because they were single and this rose to 5% among Scheduled Caste households. Only 7% of households had had to work outside their community and these had mostly received extra wages. However the scheme was less good at providing employment within 15 days of registration: 36% of respondents said this hadn't happened, ranging from 0% to 40% in the three sub-sampled villages. Despite this only 5% of respondents reported receiving unemployment allowance. 77% of respondents reported receiving payment for work within the recommended 15 days, although the qualitative data suggests payments are less regular. While these indicators are not perfect, table 2 shows improvements from the situation in 2006 while the scheme was still being rolled out. 

Table 2: Operational indicators from 2006 and 2009  

Year	Median days worked	Median household income from NREGS	% work sites with childcare 	Work available in the village
2006	6	Rs 1,500	8%	44%
2009	15	Rs 3,521	23%	93%
Source: Young Lives household questionnaire 2006 and 2009, rural younger cohort only

Accountability and monitoring
Of those who did not have a card, 40% believed that they were not eligible or did not know how to apply, which suggests that information about NREGS entitlements has not reached everyone. Awareness was similarly low about social audit, which has been heavily promoted in Andhra Pradesh: only 47% said they were aware of it being conducted in their village and this figure was as low as 20% in Poompuhar. Only 23% of respondents had participated in social audit (8% in Poompuhar). A positive finding was that those in NREGS target groups (Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe) were more likely to be aware of social audit being conducted in their community than those in other caste groups and Scheduled Caste groups were more likely to have participated (see table 3). 

Table 3: Awareness and participation in social audit by caste 







Source: Young Lives household questionnaire 2009, rural younger cohort only

Perceived impact
The median annual household income from NREGS in 2009 was Rs 3,521, although the mean was much higher (Rs 5,018), reflecting differences in household size, days of work offered, access to economic opportunities outside NREGS, etc. The median number of days worked per person between July 2008 and June 2009 was 15 (table 4). When these figures are broken down by caste, those from the wealthy Other group are working fewer days than the median (9 days rather than 15) and earning just under the median (Rs 3,507). Scheduled Tribe households are working longest (19 days) and earning slightly more than the median (Rs. 3,650). While households from Scheduled Tribes are working more than as twice as much as those from Other households (19 days versus 8 days), this is not reflected in the difference in median household income from NREGS between the caste groups (range Rs 3,160-3,897). The difference in income is unlikely to be due to differences in household size between the caste groups as this only ranges from 5.49 to 6.32 persons. If we divide the individual income by the number of days worked (table 4), Backward Caste and Other appear to be getting the highest wage rates and Scheduled Tribe the lowest, although these differences are not statistically significant. As we know from the literature, there is variation in rates paid due to location, but not caste (Johnson and Tannirkulam 2009). However, the two variables may be difficult to separate; for example, as tribal households live mostly in remote areas with few economic opportunities they may receive a lower daily rate, due to lack of competition from other employers. This did not appear to be the case in Patna, the tribal village within the qualitative sample, so there may be other explanations such as fewer adult household members in tribal households or higher levels of migration. Overall the data suggests that the program is reaching the poorest groups, but also benefitting wealthier households (or poorer households within wealthier caste groups), which may be necessary for the program to maintain popular support.  

Table 4: Days worked and household income from NREGS by caste 







Source: Young Lives household questionnaire 2009, rural younger cohort only

The physical and educational outcomes for rural Young Lives children aged 7-8 in households participating in NREGS are notably poorer, which suggests that the programme is effectively targeting the poorest. For example, 32% of children aged 7-8 from NREGS households could not read anything versus 20% from non-NREGS households. Similarly, 36% of children aged 7-8 from NREGS households were stunted, versus 26% from non-NREGS households. Participants from NREGS households who had worked in the last 12 months were more likely to have experienced a range of environmental problems, the most common of which was crop failure (6% of the sample, 79% of which came from NREGS households). This suggests that work on NREGS is providing some protection against food insecurity in the face of shocks. 





95% of households in Katur had a job card and had worked in the last 12 months, which is higher than the other two villages and the Young Lives sample as a whole. 75% of households said that social audit had been conducted in their village and 63% had participated in it, which was also higher than the sample as a whole. According to the meti the community is ready to question any delay or discrepancy: “they call either the concerned official or the press reporters. They have the telephone numbers of the press reporters and the officials”.

Few respondents reported not receiving payment within 15 days (15%), all of which suggests that within this community the programme is relatively well-run. The median number of days worked per person between July 2008 and June 2009 was 18 (range 0-172) and the median individual income was Rs 3,541 (the median household income was Rs 10,889), which is much higher than for the sample as a whole.

The impression of a well-run programme is confirmed by the interviews with the Sarpanch and the Field Assistant, who has been employed since the start of the scheme in 2006. NREGS involves 85% of households, almost all of which work regularly. The scheme has brought 60-70 acres of private land under cultivation and the community has received drinking water storage for animals and water from rainwater harvesting. Nonetheless, there has been some resistance from landlords who say they are “spoiling” the labourers with better wages and working conditions. The landlords also determine the timetable as during peak agricultural work "the important elders in the village will ask them to stop the drought works for some time. Then they will stop the work" (Revanth). 

Staffing and procedures 
The Field Assistant is paid Rs 2,200 per month, which is based on the number of days worked by NREGS labourers. In 2008 a block system was introduced which divided the village into four 250 acre sections; work could only be carried out in one section at a time so the Field Assistant can supervise. The metis work alongside their labourers and receive an additional payment of Rs 1 per labourer, per day for supervision (i.e. Rs 20 per day). Katur is the only one of the three villages to compensate the meti, which may reduce the motivation for fraud. 

Workers apparently receive Rs 100 per day and a travel allowance of Rs 10 if they have to travel 4-5 km to the work site. First aid kits and water are provided on site, plus an ayah (nanny) if there are children under five. In each work group there are 11 women and 9 men and men receive an extra Rs 2 because their work is heavier. Janaki described how "it is really difficult for people like my father as they have to dig the stones, move them aside, break them into smaller pieces and lift them". Nonetheless, the women’s work of passing baskets of stones and mud along a line for emptying is also hard. Triveni described having pain in her legs for several days as “when they remove mud they don't check whether there are any children or not; for children and adults they put equally”. One or two people have been injured lifting/ carrying stones and their medical bills were paid by the Mandal Development Officer. They were paid compensation of Rs 1,800 and Rs 1,400 respectively and received a proportion of their wages (20-50%) while they were recovering. 

If families have a child aged 16 their name is written in their parents' job card until they turn 18 and then they can have their own card. Age is certified with a photocopy of the ration card to prevent children working. Nonetheless, some children are working on their parents' job cards and in these cases the fieldworkers will conceal them when “higher officials” arrive (Mamatha). The children’s focus groups confirmed that children worked for their parents during the holidays: Triveni said they would substitute for their parents if they couldn't attend, even during term time, and Mamatha explained that because people need to turn up on the first day of the week or they wouldn't be allowed to work for the rest of the week, parents had to send their children. 

Three of the participants in the boys’ focus group said that they were pressurised by their parents to attend NREGS (Revanth, Reddy, Govindh). Triveni also described how she wasn’t able to go to school when there was a lot of work and as a result fell behind in her studies. Govindh combines NREGS with college, which he is able to do because he works from 7 to 11 and starts college at 1pm. His wage enables him to pay “for my college fees and institution fees [...it] purchases all my stuff like pens, clothes”.

The metis are sympathetic to children who are studying and send them home during lunch break when there is little more work to do. As the supervisors are rarely at the site they don't know that students go early; if they did they would reduce the amount the students were paid to Rs 50-60. The workgroups know when supervisors are coming as the Field Assistant calls the meti. This happened two months ago and all the students had to come back to work, although in the end the supervisors didn't turn up. Manoj and Vishnu also combine NREGS and studying, but said that because the work was physically demanding it was hard to go from one to the other. 

The number of workers and amount of money earned is calculated by the Field Assistant and entered into the computer system within 3 days so that workers receive the money in their Post Office accounts within 4-5 days. The process depends on the information submitted by the Field Assistant, which according to the children’s focus groups is not always accurate. For example, Tejaswini claimed that members of her work group bribed the Field Assistant to record that they had worked when they had just attended the field site. Govindh, Reddy and Manoj said the Field Assistant expects each work group to pay him a weekly 'retainer' of Rs 100 to ensure his records are correct. If they do not, "he will not calculate properly in meters. And he will not write our bills clearly and somehow or the other he will cause us trouble, madam” (Reddy).

Accountability mechanisms
A Gram Sabha is held once or twice a month to address any problems relating to workers and materials. The Gram Sabha also identify and prioritise work for the next year. Cluster level meetings are held once per month and according to the Sarpanch these are challenging because "during meetings [Panchayat representatives] are asked questions and have to answer them properly, have to prove that, people are benefiting by these schemes". For example, the Field Assistant describes how he ‘dreads’ these meetings as “some person who is politically influential turns up and questions about the irregularities [in the wage payments]. He openly confronts me saying why is a person being paid more and why is the other being paid less? Then there develops a tension between both the groups, each blaming the other for making more money”. 

In addition to Gram Sabha the village has had a social audit which involves a team of 8-10 literate people checking door-to-door whether people have received their wages. Mandal officials visit every 1st or 2nd Saturday of the month, primarily looking for absenteeism, although as work groups usually know in advance when they are coming they can avoid scrutiny. For example, Reddy and Govindh explained that when people came to check if children were working the Field Assistant or the meti were warned by mobile phone and the children would join the shepherds grazing near the workplace until it was safe to return. Revanth also described how his work group leader would get a call to send workers from his group to another one, which was being checked at that time:

There was mutual understanding between groups for exchange of workers for the purpose of showing a greater number of workers to the checking officers. For example, if in his group forty workers are working, the checking officers will count the forty workers and they record accordingly. When the checking officers went to verify another group, some of the workers from this group will go to join that group in case there is a shortage of workers

The children’s focus groups described a range of other dubious practices which included marking attendance in someone else’s work book and sharing the profits within the work group, paying Rs 500 to the Field Assistant to get job cards for under 18s (apparently 20 children in the village have done this), marking people present when they are absent, or present but not working, inflating the measurement of work done, and allowing older relatives of the work group leader to attend, but banning other old people. The latter is an example of how people don’t seem to resent corruption per se, just when it leads to inequality. In fact, when one of the fieldworkers suggested reporting the Field Assistant Revanth was quick to observe that "if we report to higher officials they will dismiss this person. He has a daughter, a son, and all the family members".

Perceived impact
The Sarpanch claims that the scheme has had a positive impact on participants and increased both the numbers who send their children to school and those who send their children "to good schools in the towns". He maintains that families are eating better and drinking has reduced (the boys’ focus group attributed this to a preference for more expensive branded liquor). Families are also strengthening their economic position which should enable their eventual ‘graduation’ from the scheme: 

Suppose husband and wife are working under this scheme they both can earn say up to Rs 1200 to 1300 per week and if they add Rs 200 or 300 to it they buy a goat and if they rear it well they can sell each goat for Rs 3000 to 4000 and get twice the amount in a short time
(Sarpanch) 

NREGS had also raised local wages, which was why Tejaswini said that only the kammas (landlords) had not benefited as no-one was prepared to work for Rs 40 per day anymore. 

The girls’ focus group perceived the main benefit as reduced migration as families are now able to work in NREGS rather than migrate to Bombay or to Gunthakal (40 km away) to work in the concrete factory. The boys’ focus group felt the benefits were fewer working hours: “we go to work in the morning and work for some time and we are able to make Rs 100, madam. Everything just in a jiffy” (Reddy). This meant that participants could work in their own fields or for other employers in the afternoons. However, small families’ benefited less than large ones as they had fewer household members to work. 

Specifically in relation to children, the benefits were greater availability of cash to meet children's needs (Tejaswini, Mamatha, Govindh). For example, Triveni described how “previously when there was less money, I used to buy fewer note books and used to write two subjects in one book only, madam. Now after the drought works came I am able to keep one book for each subject”. The boys’ focus group provided a long list of goods purchased by households: mobile phones, fans, clothes, utensils, satellite TV, sheep, gold for a dowry, and house construction. However, Vishnu was the only person who mentioned saving, which supports the feeling of participants in the girls’ focus group that NREGS only provided enough for daily necessities (“small helps”). 

An indirect impact, also observed in Patna, was an increase in social cohesiveness through working together in groups, as Triveni describes:





In Poompuhar, although 93% of households had a job card, only 57% had worked in the last 12 months. This could be because households are holding cards as a form or insurance; however, taken in conjunction with data indicating that only 20% of respondents were aware of social audit being conducted in their village and 8% said they had participated, it suggests there are some problems with the scheme. A quarter of respondents reported not receiving payment for work done within the recommended 15 days, which is slightly higher than the sample average. The large proportion of children aged 7-8 in NREGS households who cannot read (56%) or are stunted (37%) suggest that in this village the programme is effectively targeting the poorest. 

The median number of days worked per person between July 2008 and June 2009 was 14 (range 0-73) and the median individual income was Rs 1,693 (the median household income was Rs 4,058).

Staffing and procedures 
The scheme started in 2007 and in Poompuhar it was initially for Scheduled Caste households only. According to the meti four times as many women as men were interested in working, which affected the types of work that could be carried out. Work was identified initially by asking Scheduled Caste landowners what they needed done. This offer has now been extended to landowners from Backward Castes (e.g. Vadde, Boya), which is how they came to receive the majority of the orange plants, drips and pipelines in the recent disbursement. This year NREGS is concentrating on jungle cutting and maintenance of the roads to the wells, even though roads are covered by other government schemes and provide work to fewer labourers. One participant in the girls’ focus group, Sahithi, suggested they should construct dams instead which would benefit the whole of the village during the rainy season. 

According to the meti there is little work available at the moment (n.b. the Sarpanch and the children’s focus groups said that work had been on hold for over four months): "when the work was done three months ago there were 150 persons. Now 20 or 30 persons go. Yesterday nearly 300 people came to me but there was not so much road work." Participants work from 9 or 10am till 3 or 4pm (6 to 7 hours). Each work group has one water pot and members take turns to keep it full. Labourers collect weekly payments from the Post Office, which requires up to one day’s travel. The payments are made in exchange for slips provided by the Field Assistant who calculates them after measuring the work done. 

While the NREGS guidelines are clear about procedures if people are injured (for example, their treatment is provided and paid for by the government, see Katur), the girls’ focus group maintained that this was not happening and workers had to make their own way to the doctor (Sahithi). The meti suggested that this was the workers’ preference, even in the case of an injury with a crowbar: 

[I] offered to take him to the hospital and get the dressing done and told him that the bill would be paid by [me]. But he said ‘nothing will happen; it’s nothing’ and took some local leaves and got a bandage

Rupesh was the only boy in their focus group who had worked in NREGS when his mother was ill. He said that schoolchildren did work in the scheme although they did not work alongside adults. Nonetheless, he preferred not to work because NREGS paid piece-rates, which meant wages varied greatly and could not be relied upon. Sahithi maintained that no children worked on NREGS because if they were found the work would be stopped for everyone (although she had worked on NREGS). She recounted a visit from an inspector who warned the villagers that this was a punishable crime and told the metis that they would be removed from their positions if it happened again. Nonetheless, the work had been stopped the day before the girls’ focus group as children were found on site, and exemptions were made if parents are sick or girls marry.

Accountability mechanisms
While monitoring is meant to happen at many levels, both within NREGS (e.g. meti, Field Assistant, Mandal Development Officer) and outside it (e.g. Sarpanch, Panchayat secretary), respondents in Poompuhar felt there had been failures at every stage. As a result, some maintained that the quality of the assets created was poor: 

[The pond] should be useful to the farmers by allowing the water to stagnate and thus be of use [as fertiliser] to the farmer.  But it is not going on like that, 300 persons go as a ritual, dig the trench and come back. They are not piling up the earth systematically. The trenches are also not deep enough so as to allow the stagnation of water. 
 (Sarpanch’s brother, Retired government clerk)

The irregularities start with the meti whose role was established relatively recently. Despite this they have considerable power: "whatever the meti writes is the law and whatever the meti assigns is the work" (Sarpanch’s brother). The meti registers workers, ensures they have a Post Office account, marks attendance and takes this information to be entered, and allocates work, but despite this receives no pay. The lack of pay may explain the high incidence of financial mismanagement. Financial mismanagement is made possible by lack of supervision - currently Poompuhar doesn't have a Technical Assistant - and knowledge of their entitlements among the workers. The brother of the Sarpanch maintains that “[the metis] do not provide any facilities like water or for care of children. Nor do these people ask. The main problem is that officers do not come to inspect the work." 

Types of error include increasing the number of days worked, misappropriating the identities of workers so even if someone only worked one day in a week they would be put down for the whole week and the money taken on their behalf, and adding ‘ghost workers’ where the meti inflates the number of his work group by 20 and takes their pay. This means that his work group only get half the payment that they would have received because the payment for work done is divided between 40 workers rather than 20. Subsequently, the Mandal Development Officer was removed because he could not control the metis. In this mandal the metis seem to have responded to the expectation that they would do the work of the meti in addition to the work of a labourer with no compensation by inflating the number of workers in their group and taking the difference. 

The irregularities continue with the Field Assistant who is responsible for, among other things, submitting applications from farmers to have work done on their land and measuring the area of work carried out to calculate payment. In Poompuhar he was replaced by the Superintendent because he was paying workers less than what was due for their work and the metis informed the Mandal Development Officer. According to the Sarpanch, "There were complaints from all the villages that he was showing more numbers of labourers, and that he was himself pocketing the wages of four or five labourers.” 

Supervision at higher levels is apparently cursory: "The officers also come in jeeps [...] they just ask one or two persons if the work is going on well. The moment they say yes, these officers go away" (Sarpanch). While the Sarpanch was critical of the mismanagement of the scheme, he was criticised in turn by the girls’ focus group for not providing oversight and only seeming to care about the problems of his neighbours rather than the village as a whole (for example, refusing to counter-sign official documents for the villagers) (Sarada, Vasudha, Jayanthi). The children’s focus groups, however, argued that the problem was systemic rather than the fault of individuals. People were being cheated because they were illiterate and powerless - "if you complain they say “if you don't like this then stop coming”" (Sarada, Sahithi) - or because other members of the work group were benefiting financially from these practices (Rupesh, Rahul). Jayanthi maintained that:

NREGS is a very good programme, but [due to] the influence of politicians and leaders of our village it was spoiled. The government is giving better wages, but the labourers are not getting the whole amount [because of] cuts by the metis and field assistants

Perceived impact
There have been environmental benefits from the programme; for example, the water table has risen, increasing agricultural production from 10-15 to 40 bags. Additionally, after the construction of the bunds (embankments), the village has always had water in the wells and the crops have not dried out. 125 farmers have had their land levelled and supplied with water which means they can grow paddy, onions and seed cotton. This may be why Jayanthi argued that those who had benefitted greatest were the politically influential who used NREGS labour to level their lands and dig ponds. The benefits to landless households are less obvious and the Sarpanch argues that this is because households would need to work continuously for 100 days to benefit and due to the problems with the scheme they haven't even been able to work for 20 days. The meti, however, locates the problem with the villagers: “if they start coming daily, then it will amount to 100 days.  But in practice people come one week for this work and go for other work the next week and again come for one week here. [...] As of now no one is coming continually, neither the poor nor the rich”. 

The experiences of Vasudha’s father suggest a possible reason for irregular attendance: it is difficult to predict how much will be earned through NREGS. For example in one 15-day period her father earned Rs 500-600, in another Rs 300. Additionally, her father is now able to find agricultural work easily, with higher wages than before, which is an indirect benefit of NREGS: "if [the wages] are not raised, they do not come [...] they demand more now" (Vasudha). The greater availability of work locally has also reduced migration, which previously left children without any caregivers (Sahithi, Sarada).





In Patna, located in a remote, tribal area, only 54% of households had a job card, all of whom had worked in the last 12 months. 70% of those without a job card believed that they were not eligible or did not know how to apply. This suggests that knowledge about NREGS is not reaching the most marginalised, possibly because tribal communities are small and dispersed. Nonetheless, 75% of respondents were aware of social audit being conducted in their village although only 23% had participated. Almost all respondents had received payment for work done within 15 days and none waited longer than this for work. The majority of children aged 7-8 from NREGS households were stunted (57%), which reflects the poverty of this community. The median number of days worked per person between July 2008 and June 2009 was 16 (range 0-90) and the median individual income was Rs 2,960 (the median household income was Rs 5,432).

Staffing and procedures 
The scheme has been in operation since 2007 and originally targeted households who were officially below the poverty line. Scheduled Tribes are still the main users of the scheme as according to the Panchayat secretary they are "hard workers", earning Rs 70-100 per day. Nonetheless, the Assistant Project Director complained that people come irregularly due to bazaars, festivals, marriages, deaths, etc. and implied that prior to NREGS they had not had a strong work ethic. 

NREGS work begins at 6am and is scheduled in two phases, morning and evening, to avoid the heat. There is some flexibility about when people arrive and leave as long as they stay for a full day and the work is completed (according to the girls’ focus group work patterns were flexible enough to allow people to return the following day to complete work they had not finished). The meti is required to recruit 40 members into the workgroup, not 20, as in the other villages. If he can do this, he gets paid a daily rate without working; if not, he needs to work to make up the numbers. Workers receive payment from the local Post Office after 14 days, although according to the Sarpanch it can take up to one month. The delay makes NREGS less appealing than daily labour for the poor as "after working, they have to buy household needs, but they are paying once in 15 days or even one month also" (Sarpanch). The delay means that they need to take loans and are getting "cheated again from outside" (ibid). Workers receive an extra 20% wages between March and May when the soil is comparatively dry and hard. 

The main priority for NREGS work is developing plots of land, typically 4-5 acres in size, which have been identified as dry, fallow, or low yielding. The work is done on small farmers' lands, patta (titled) land and wasteland. The Field Assistant can potentially act as a patron, as in other communities, because he decides who is put forward for work on their lands. 30-40 farmers have had work done and benefited doubly as their households were paid for their labour as well. The scheme has also increased storage in 16 ponds, constructed 100 check dams, which drain into the fields and increase the fertility of the soil, and dug three foot pits around trees which are bound with stones to protect them during dry and rainy seasons (the pits collect water and leaves which decompose as fertiliser). This meant that ponds that used to dry up in January now last until March or April, which enables a second crop. During the rainy season farmers planted mango, guava, cashew and sapota, which were provided free from the Department of Horticulture. The planting was an example of the ‘convergence approach’ taken in tribal areas where the programmes of a number of departments are brought together and NREGS is used to pay for the wage component. This enables more ambitious programming; for example, this year they plan to dig trenches, which will divert water from the hills into the cashew nut plantations, and repair the roads. Despite these benefits, farmers have petitioned the organisers due to the shortage of labour during the peak agriculture season:

We farmers are losing because of this. In this work, we give Rs.100 as wages. Even if we offer much money, we won’t get labor madam. We told about it to our Mandal Development Officer in the meeting. We need 20 or 30 days for sowing, 30 days for cutting [harvesting] the crop. We collect cashew crop in the months of April and May. We ask them to break the work in these 4 months
(Sarpanch)

Farmers have also complained about the escalation of wages, particularly for women: "for weeding they gave Rs 100 to women. [...] The women say that they are getting Rs 100 in government work even [though] they don’t do anything. They ask “how much can you give us, if we come to your work?"” (Sarpanch). In addition to its effects on existing labourers, NREGS has encouraged women into the paid workforce who weren’t participating previously. For example, Trisha’s mother feels that “NREGS works are easy [...as] they can go early and come back early”. She now has income that she controls to spend on school materials and gifts for her daughter and repay a loan taken for her son’s healthcare. 

The organisers check the age of participants from their job card, student record or birth certificate and if these aren't available they estimate it from their “physical status”. Only people who are "physically sound" are recruited, which excludes the over 50s - "as they are aged people they can't do work" (Meti). The rules are now stricter about employing children: "previously when parents are unable to do work then the children of 15 or 16 years will do and it is managed by the team. But now they are being told that children should not be included and that is an offence" (Panchayat secretary). The girls’ focus group confirmed this, describing how one girl tried to work, but was sent home by the Field Assistant. Nonetheless, according to Anita adults will let others work on their books in exchange for half of the wage, although this seems to be a private arrangement. 

The authorities are encouraged to deter even older students from working – one student described as “tribal poor” was refused because “every student has to study without fail; his total career must not get affected" (Assistant Project Director). Another was told “if you go to the work, who will go to college on behalf of you?” (Sarpanch) However, some students work for a couple of weeks in the summer to support their education and this is considered to be beneficial, even for those who had previously dropped out: 

With this work, children are sent back to schools, as some of them have discontinued. So, they are encouraged in their studies. Previously, they had financial problem. Now, whenever there is a need, they are going for work and some have bank accounts 
(Panchayat secretary)

According to the Assistant Project Director the way NREGS work is organised has increased social cohesion as well as economic security:

The work has helped to grow collectiveness. Before all were doing their respective works; but since NREGS started they have [been formed into] groups of 20, they come together and work, and if they have a problem they all respond. For some issues [due to work in NREGS] the money is ready; so if they have a problem in a financial or social aspect they respond very well [to each other]

NREGS has provided work for people with physical disabilities, for example, as water carriers, and for older people taking care of workers’ children. 

If anyone is injured on a worksite, a range of measures apply: for minor injuries - first aid, major injuries - treatment costs at the local hospital and 50% wages for the first week, decreasing percentages thereafter, disabling injuries - Rs 50,000, death - Rs 1-2 lakhs. This provision is important because "so many people are hurt, while they are using the instruments and by hitting the stones" (Sarpanch). In the same way as the scheme has strengthened social networks and provided resources for them to share at times of crisis, the responsibility for people's health on site appears to have extended to a more general responsibility, which reflects the integrated approach of the ITDA:





As in the other villages, one of the main complaints from participants is the level of wages and the way these are affected by the measurements. The Panchayat secretary acknowledges that there is variation in payment, e.g. from as little as Rs 50 to Rs 120, but says that this depends on their level of work: “if they do according to the measurements, each will be paid Rs 100". He described an incident the previous day when “[students] come for work in a hurried way and do the work. They got only Rs 35. The other batch got Rs 110 in the same village. They came to him and asked about variation. Immediately, they went there and measured. It is not as per norms. Then they kept quiet. Always, the money they get is according to their work". 

However, the Sarpanch described an occasion when 250 people only got Rs 20 for a day's work when they should have got at least Rs 40-50, “even if the work hadn't been done well”, which resulted in the meti responsible being replaced. He also said that Field Assistants were inflating the number of workers – “if 100 people go to daily labour, they are adding 25 to that” – which reduced the wages for the others. This was confirmed by the girls’ focus group, for example, Gayatri described an occasion on which the wrong figure was entered into the computer so they only got Rs 60. This example illustrates the dependence of technological solutions on information collected by humans. Despite this, the village apparently emerged well from the social audit, which ‘only’ identified Rs 1.6 lakh fraud and Rs 4 lakh delayed payments (Assistant Project Director). This success was attributed by the key informants to frequent monitoring by the ITDA Project Officer. 

Perceived impact
The main impact of NREGS in this community is reduction in migration; previously families migrated for six months to Hyderabad, Madras, Vizag and Vijayawada, which disrupted children’s schooling and exposed them to exploitation from urban employers. The Sarpanch, for example, described how "a lady had come in a costly car. She called the boys for mason work. She offered them 250 rupees wages per day and requested them to come”. Even though no “elders” went because “[they] know the truth, that they will get work in the village”, some young people went and “after getting the work done with these labourers for five or six months, they hit them when they asked for their wages". 

NREGS also provides a form of weather insurance for small farmers (c.f. Johnson and Tannirkulum 2009); according to the Sarpanch farmers invested Rs 10,000 per acre in their crops this year and lost this due to lack of rain, which meant that they also needed to work. Rajesh described how despite the destruction of their crops the NREGS income meant that they could still afford to buy rice (four of Rajesh’s household members work in the scheme). The following year Rajesh’s household was able to buy “good food”, clothes, school materials, and pay college fees for the elder daughter who had previously had to stop studying due to lack of money (c.f. Kareemulla et al 2009).





Among rural households in Young Lives, membership of and participation in NREGS is relatively high: 68% of households have worked in the scheme during the past 12 months, and the figure rises to 77% for Scheduled Caste and 80% for Scheduled Tribes. However, the median household income from NREGS during the past 12 months is only Rs 3,539 (the individual income is Rs 1,848) and the median number of days worked is just 15. This suggests that its impact may be relatively limited (we discuss below why this might be), although the marginal value of this cash income to poor households is likely to be considerable.  

Before looking at some of the challenges faced by NREGS, illustrated by the experiences of villages in the qualitative sub sample, it may be worth emphasising that within Young Lives sample, and Andhra Pradesh as a whole (Reddy et al, 2010), NREGS has been successful in its stated objectives of increasing the livelihood security of landed and landless households, reducing rural-urban migration and empowering rural women, at least in relation to the wages they are now able to command. The extent to which the communal assets it has generated are productive remains to be seen, although productivity of individual farmers has certainly increased, and the environmental benefits should become evident over the next decade. 

NREGS is a complex and costly scheme and in the early years it struggled without dedicated staff or an appropriately sized budget for administration. However, Young Lives quantitative data suggest improvements between Rounds 2 (2006) and 3 (2009) of survey data collection, for example, in the provision of childcare facilities. Below we discuss some of the continuing challenges for the scheme that have emerged from the qualitative research and are supported by the findings of studies reviewed in the first part of the paper. While there was variation in the experiences of people in Katur, Patna, and Poompuhar, and the schemes in Katur and Patna were considerably better run, they shared the problems below which reflect the realities of programme implementation. 

*	Lack of knowledge among respondents in relation to eligibility for NREGS and entitlements, particularly in the tribal community. Limited confidence in their ability to get these entitlements from NREGS officials. 
*	Lack of interest, especially among men
*	Insufficient work, due to projects not having been approved, delay in approvals or projects being approved which don’t require much labour (e.g. road building)
*	Schemes having been halted or slowed, which is the effect of the block system in Katur, due to financial mismanagement or pressure from farmers (e.g. Poompuhar, Katur) and conflicts within the community (e.g. Poompuhar)
*	Financial mismanagement reducing workers’ wages and contributing to lack of interest
*	Concentration on the development of private lands, typically owned by less poor households, the majority of which are not part of Young Lives (Young Lives has a pro-poor sample). 
*	Preferential treatment, for example, poor households in the qualitative sample who had had their land developed often had relationships with local NREGS staff or other powerful people, or had questioned the fairness of the selection process which reportedly led to their inclusion to stop them protesting 
*	Managing children’s participation within the scheme; currently regulations are inconsistently enforced and policed and can be overridden through additional payments (e.g. in Katur). While some children benefit, others report problems combining physically demanding work with schooling
*	Concerns over the quality of the infrastructure produced and the likely long-term benefits

Nonetheless, there are some examples of good practice, for example, people with disabilities working as water carriers in Patna, and the high level of participation in social audit in Katur, which was also the village with fewest examples of mismanagement. There have clearly been many benefits in terms of the local environment (e.g. rising water tables) and the security and prosperity of individual households, whether they own farmland or not. There have also been ‘softer’ outcomes such as the inclusion of older people and people with disabilities and the beneficial effects of working in groups. But these beneficial outcomes have been accompanied by exclusion, which is often gender-based. For example, the policy towards older people in Patna or single women in Poompuhar and the effective exclusion of women with young children by the limited availability of childcare onsite. The scheme has also increased inequality by providing greater benefits to landlords, larger households, those administering the scheme, and those within work groups who benefit from dubious practices. The perception of unfairness has led to growing mistrust and resentment, not only in relation to the scheme and its administrators, but also within the community as a whole.  

The children’s focus groups in particular identified examples of mismanagement at all levels and described the barriers to taking action to redress these. For example, when people protest they are not believed: Triveni said that when she told the Field Assistant old people were being marked present without working because they were relatives of the meti “he said that everyone is equal to [the meti], and why will he do like that?”. People may also feel that the consequences for the offender would be too severe: "if we report to higher officials they will dismiss this person. He has a daughter, a son, and all the family members" (Revanth). All respondents, however, agreed on the need for better supervision at all levels to ensure that basic procedures for recording attendance and work done are being followed. This might be more helpful in cases of systemic corruption such as Poompuhar than the processes of social audit and innovation in IT (e.g. introduction of smart cards) for which Andhra Pradesh has been so widely praised.  

Despite the problems described above most poor people are supportive of the scheme, which has increased availability of work, household expenditure, and wage rates, and reduced working hours. Questions for policymakers to explore include the possibility that Scheduled Tribes are benefitting less from their participation than other groups, possibly due to mismanagement of the scheme in these communities (n.b. this finding emerges from the Young Lives sample as a whole rather the qualitative case study of Patna), examples of exclusion or self-exclusion of vulnerable groups such as female household heads and the elderly, and differences in performance between communities, which are illustrated by the qualitative case studies. 
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^1	  The block panchayat is a local government body that works with a group of villages who form a Development Block. It provides a link between individual panchayats and the district administration.
^2	  A Gram Panchayat is the self governing body of villages or towns with over 300 inhabitants.
^3	  Gram Sabha are meetings of all the adults who live in the area covered by a Panchayat to hold the Panchayat officials to account.
^4	  A Mandal is a subdivision of a State comprising several districts
^5	  The Scheduled Castes (SCs), also known as the Dalit, and the Scheduled Tribes (STs) are two historically disadvantaged groups who are recognized in the Constitution of India which undertakes to address the gap between their opportunities and those of other caste groups.
^6	  Forward Castes are historically privileged groups who do not qualify for any reservations in politics or education. Backward or Other Backward Caste is a flexible designation for caste groups that are not Scheduled, but are nonetheless disadvantaged at a particular point in time.
